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Index to the Antifederalist Papers

• Antifederalist No. 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION: A DANGEROUS PLAN OF BENEFIT ONLY TO THE “ARISTOCRATICK COMBINATION”
• Antifederalist No. 2 “WE HAVE BEEN TOLD OF PHANTOMS”
• Antifederalist No. 3 NEW CONSTITUTION CREATES A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; WILL NOT ABATE FOREIGN INFLUENCE; DANGERS OF CIVIL WAR AND DESPOTISM
• Antifederalist No. 4 FOREIGN WARS, CIVIL WARS, AND INDIAN WARS – THREE BUGBEARS
• Antifederalist No. 5 SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND – A CASE IN POINT
• Antifederalist No. 6 THE HOBGOBLINS OF ANARCHY AND DISSENSIONS AMONG THE STATES
• Antifederalist No. 7 ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION WILL LEAD TO CIVIL WAR
• Antifederalist No. 8 “THE POWER VESTED IN CONGRESS OF SENDING TROOPS FOR SUPPRESSING INSURRECTIONS WILL ALWAYS ENABLE THEM TO STIFLE THE FIRST STRUGGLES OF FREEDOM”
• Antifederalist No. 9 A CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT IS A TYRANNY
• Antifederalist No. 10 ON THE PRESERVATION OF PARTIES, PUBLIC LIBERTY DEPENDS
• Antifederalist No. 11 UNRESTRICTED POWER OVER COMMERCE SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
• Antifederalist No. 12 HOW WILL THE NEW GOVERNMENT RAISE MONEY?
• Antifederalist No. 13 THE EXPENSE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT
• Antifederalist No. 14 EXTENT OF TERRITORY UNDER CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT TOO LARGE TO PRESERVE LIBERTY OR PROTECT PROPERTY
• Antifederalist No. 15 RHODE ISLAND IS RIGHT!
• Antifederalist No. 16 EUROPEANS ADMIRE AND FEDERALISTS DECRY THE PRESENT SYSTEM
• Antifederalist No. 17 FEDERALIST POWER WILL ULTIMATELY SUBVERT STATE AUTHORITY
• Antifederalist No. 18-20 WHAT DOES HISTORY TEACH? (PART 1)
• Antifederalist No. 18-20 WHAT DOES HISTORY TEACH? (PART II)
• Antifederalist No. 21 WHY THE ARTICLES FAILED
• Antifederalist No. 22 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION SIMPLY REQUIRES AMENDMENTS, PARTICULARLY FOR COMMERCIAL POWER AND JUDICIAL POWER; CONSTITUTION GOES TOO FAR
• Antifederalist No. 23 CERTAIN POWERS NECESSARY FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, CAN AND SHOULD BE LIMITED
• Antifederalist No. 24 OBJECTIONS TO A STANDING ARMY (PART I)
• Antifederalist No. 25 OBJECTIONS TO A STANDING ARMY (PART II)
• Antifederalist No. 26 THE USE OF COERCION BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT (PART 1)
• Antifederalist No. 27 THE USE OF COERCION BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT (PART 2)
• Antifederalist No. 28 THE USE OF COERCION BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT (PART III)
• Antifederalist No. 29 OBJECTIONS TO NATIONAL CONTROL OF THE MILITIA
• Antifederalist No. 30-31 A VIRGINIA ANTIFEDERALIST ON THE ISSUE OF TAXATION
• Antifederalist No. 32 FEDERAL TAXATION AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED POWERS (PART I)
• Antifederalist No. 33 FEDERAL TAXATION AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED POWERS (PART II)
• Antifederalist No. 34 THE PROBLEM OF CONCURRENT TAXATION
• Antifederalist No. 35 FEDERAL TAXING POWER MUST BE RESTRAINED
• Antifederalist No. 36 REPRESENTATION AND INTERNAL TAXATION
• Antifederalist No. 37 FACTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION
• Antifederalist No. 38 SOME REACTIONS TO FEDERALIST ARGUMENTS
• Antifederalist No. 39 APPEARANCE AND REALITY-THE FORM IS FEDERAL; THE EFFECT IS NATIONAL
• Antifederalist No. 40 ON THE MOTIVATIONS AND AUTHORITY OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS
• Antifederalist No. 41-43 (Part 1) Richard Henry Lee “THE QUANTITY OF POWER THE UNION MUST POSSESS IS ONE THING; THE MODE OF EXERCISING THE POWERS GIVEN IS QUITE A DIFFERENT CONSIDERATION”
• Antifederalist No. 41-43 (Part II) (Richard Henry Lee) “THE QUANTITY OF POWER THE UNION MUST POSSESS IS ONE THING; THE MODE OF EXERCISING THE POWERS GIVEN IS QUITE A DIFFERENT CONSIDERATION”
• Antifederalist No. 44 WHAT CONGRESS CAN DO; WHAT A STATE CAN NOT
• Antifederalist No. 45 POWERS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DANGEROUS TO STATE GOVERNMENTS; NEW YORK AS AN EXAMPLE
• Antifederalist No. 46 “WHERE THEN IS THE RESTRAINT?”
• Antifederalist No. 47 “BALANCE” OF DEPARTMENTS NOT ACHIEVED UNDER NEW CONSTITUTION
• Antifederalist No. 48 NO SEPARATION OF DEPARTMENTS RESULTS IN NO RESPONSIBILITY
• Antifederalist No. 49 ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS (PART 1)
• Antifederalist No. 50 ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS (PART 2)
• Antifederalist No. 51 DO CHECKS AND BALANCES REALLY SECURE THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE?
• Antifederalist No. 52 ON THE GUARANTEE OF CONGRESSIONAL BIENNIAL ELECTIONS
• Antifederalist No. 53 A PLEA FOR THE RIGHT OF RECALL
• Antifederalist No. 54 APPORTIONMENT AND SLAVERY: NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN VIEWS
• Antifederalist No. 55 WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 1)
• Antifederalist No. 56 WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 2)
• Antifederalist No. 57 WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 3)
• Antifederalist No. 58 WILL THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BE GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE? (PART 4)
• Antifederalist No. 59 THE DANGER OF CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ELECTIONS
• Antifederalist No. 60 WILL THE CONSTITUTION PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF FAVORITE CLASSES?
• Antifederalist No. 61 QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS REGARDING THE ELECTION OF CONGRESSMEN
• Antifederalist No. 62 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART 1)
• Antifederalist No. 63 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART 2)
• Antifederalist No. 64 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART 3)
• Antifederalist No. 65 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART 4)
• Antifederalist No. 66 From North Carolina
• Antifederalist No. 67 VARIOUS FEARS CONCERNING THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
• Antifederalist No. 68 ON THE MODE OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT
• Antifederalist No. 69 THE CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE
• Antifederalist No. 70 THE POWERS AND DANGEROUS POTENTIALS OF HIS ELECTED MAJESTY
• Antifederalist No. 71 THE PRESIDENTIAL TERM OF OFFICE
• Antifederalist No. 72 ON THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE; ON REELIGIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
• Antifederalist No. 73 DOES THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO POWER INFRINGE ON THE SEPARATION OF DEPARTMENTS?
• Antifederalist No. 74 THE PRESIDENT AS MILITARY KING
• Antifederalist No. 75 A NOTE PROTESTING THE TREATY-MAKING PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
• Antifederalist Nos. 76-77 AN ANTIFEDERALIST VIEW OF THE APPOINTING POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
• Antifederalist Nos. 78-79 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 1)
• Antifederalist No. 80 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 2)
• Antifederalist No. 81 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 3)
• Antifederalist No. 82 THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY (PART 4)
• Antifederalist No. 83 THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND THE ISSUE OF TRIAL BY JURY
• Antifederalist No. 84 ON THE LACK OF A BILL OF RIGHTS
• Antifederalist No. 85 CONCLUDING REMARKS: EVILS UNDER CONFEDERATION EXAGGERATED; CONSTITUTION MUST BE DRASTICALLY REVISED BEFORE ADOPTION

Copyright at Common Law, West El Paso Information Network, 1996